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This paper undertakes structural estimation of asymmetric auction models in a market 
for basmati, and detects the presence of a cartel consisting of a large (in market share) 
local miller and commission agents purchasing for large distant millers. The contracts 
between the distant millers and their commission agents help to explain the specific 
form that collusion takes. Simulations indicate that (i) the cartel gains considerably by 
colluding, over the competitive outcome; (ii) however, sellers (farmers) do not lose 
significantly under collusion when the commission agents bid; (iii) a knowledgeable 
auctioneer would choose much higher starting prices for auctions when commission 
agents bid, compared with the observed starting prices. The paper also shows that 
efficient collusion, the form of collusion commonly assumed in the literature, does not 
explain the data well.   
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Collusion amongst bidders in auctions has attracted the attention of antitrust cells the 
world over, and, increasingly, spurred academic research. In an important early paper, 
Hendricks and Porter (1989) stress the need to recognize that the possibility of 
collusion, and the form that it takes, is likely to depend on specific characteristics of the 
market in question. In the present paper, we undertake the detection of collusion 
amongst buyers of basmati paddy in a wholesale market in Panipat
1, using a dataset 
from a primary survey that we conducted. In this market, sales take place through open 
ascending auctions. We find evidence of a simple yet novel form of collusion, which is 
related to the fact that some of the bidders have nonstandard payoffs, specific to the 
context of this market. In particular, payoffs for a subset of bidders, conditional on 
winning, are increasing in the win price. We also argue that the characteristics of this 
market work against the possibility of 'efficient collusion', (the predominant form of 
collusion discussed in the literature)
2, and show that the data do not support it.  The 
paper thus illustrates the general point about market characteristics and forms of 
collusion made by Hendricks and Porter. It also contributes to the relatively small 
literature analyzing the structure of grain markets in developing countries. Many such 
markets in India and elsewhere use auctions to transact grain, but surprisingly, very few 
studies use auction theory to characterize these markets and study their features.  
The buyers of basmati paddy in Panipat market are mill owners who process 
basmati paddy into various grades of basmati rice. Their mills and size of operations 
displays great variation. At one end, there are small millers who sell the processed rice 
in the domestic market under generic names; at the other, there are large millers with 
recognized brand names and a significant presence in international markets.  
Apart from buyer asymmetry, a more important distinction in this market is 
between local and distant mills.  Many millers have mills located relatively close to the 
Panipat market; typically, such millers themselves participate in the bidding. On the 
other hand, a few large millers are located at considerably larger distances from the 
                                                            
1 Panipat is a district in the Northern Indian state of Haryana. 
2 In efficient collusion, if a bidding ring wins the auction, the good goes to that member of the ring who has the 







market, and employ the services of commission agents (called pakka arhtias in local 
parlance) to bid at auctions and buy grain on their behalf. As payment for this service, a 
commission agent gets 3% of the sale price of any lot of grain (i.e., the win price) that 
he purchases. Ordinarily, bidders' payoffs in auctions decrease in the win price, and one 
incentive to collude, ordinarily, is that collusion tends to depress win prices. While a 
fuller description of the commission agents and their relationship to the millers they buy 
for is in Section 2.3, we note here that their payoff from winning a grain lot increases in 
the win price.  Despite this, we find that they are part of a cartel. 
As stated earlier, the form of collusion that appears to be in operation is not 
'efficient collusion'. In such collusion, the cartel members have a mechanism by which 
their values for the object to be auctioned are revealed; the member with the highest 
value is designated to bid for the object. The open and stringently time bound nature of 
ascending auctions in Panipat (as described later) militates against the kind of 
revelation of values that is necessary for efficient collusion.  More importantly, 
conditional upon winning, a commission agent prefers to win at a higher price. So, it is 
not obvious that excluding all but one cartel members from bidding, as in efficient 
collusion, is desirable for this kind of player. 
We find that the collusive model which best describes the data (Section 4) takes 
place within a four player cartel, three of whose members are commission agents 
bidding on behalf of distant millers, the remaining member being a large local miller who 
is present at the auctions. The cartel divides up the lots to be auctioned, and, for a given 
lot, it is either the local miller who is designated to bid, or the group comprising the 3 
commission agents. In such collusion, each commission agent's probability of winning 
increases by excluding the large local miller from bidding, whereas the win price does 
not drop significantly, since all 3 commission agent cartel members bid; the net effect of 
collusion is favorable for all the cartel players (Section 5.1).  
The auction models that we use are independent (conditional on observed 
characteristics of a lot such as quality) private values (IPV) models that incorporate 
buyer asymmetry. The methodology is to estimate structural parametric models. In 
particular, the estimation here is supported by a recent identification result (Athey and 






ascending auctions, one can invert the joint distribution of win price and winner identity 
to uncover the latent distributions of all bidders.  
Structural estimation of auction models, which began with Paarsch (1992), has 
expanded fast into a large literature. The papers by Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), 
Donald and Paarsch (1996), Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Campo (2002), 
Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003), and Hong and Shum (2003), form a small and 
incomplete list. Sareen (2002) is a recent survey. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) display 
some experimental evidence in support of this kind of structural estimation, by way of 
answering criticism about the strict rationality postulates that govern the behavior of 
players in these models. The empirical literature on collusion and its detection is also 
growing fast. Besides Hendricks and Porter (1989) mentioned above, Baldwin, Marshall 
and Richard (1997), Porter and Zona (1999), Bajari and Ye (2004) are but a few 
interesting examples.  
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 contains a description of 
Panipat market, the auction process, the players, and our dataset. Section 3 describes 
the models to be estimated. Section 4 discusses the estimation results, which suggest 
that the model incorporating the collusive scheme briefly discussed above describes the 
data best. Section 5 discusses results from several simulations that use the parameter 
estimates of the collusive model. First, it is shown that the payoffs to cartel players from 
the above collusive scheme are much higher than from competition, given our 
parameter estimates (Section 5.1). Since the collusion is not ‘efficient’, this result is not 
obvious, and must be demonstrated to hold, for given parameter estimates. Next, we 
compare win prices under collusion and noncooperation (Section 5.2). We show that the 
unconventional collusion in this market has, on average, a much smaller downward 
impact on win prices than it would be otherwise. Finally, in Section 5.3, though we 
eschew computing optimal reserve prices, we show that an auctioneer who is aware of 
the collusive scheme would use starting prices that differ vastly between lots on which 
the large local miller is designated to bid, and those on which the group of commission 








2. The Basmati Paddy Market in Panipat 
Basmati is an aromatic, long-grain rice variety, grown only in Northern India and 
Pakistan. A large proportion of Indian basmati is exported. Premium basmati on the 
Indian domestic market retails at prices ten times greater than those for cheap rice 
varieties. The supply chain begins with farmers, who harvest basmati paddy from the 
middle of October to late December, and bring the grain to regulated
3 markets to be 
auctioned
4. The paddy is bought by private millers, who process it into rice. Processing 
includes de-husking, cleaning, polishing, and separating the rice into different quality 
grades.  The rice then finds it way into retail domestic and international markets in 
various ways -- as generic basmati rice, under the miller's brand name, or under the 
brand names of different retailers or trading houses. 
Panipat is a small (in terms of volume of transactions) regulated market situated 
in the state of Haryana. Our data set corresponds to the 1999 harvest season when 
basmati arrivals totaled approximately 127,000 quintals. 
 
2.1. The Auction Process 
In order to sell their paddy, farmers must contract with market agents known as katcha 
arhtias, whose job it is to weigh the grain, display the grain in lots in the market yard, 
and provide overnight storage, in return for 2 percent of the price at which the grain 
sells. The lots are sold one by one through an ascending auction.  The auctioning of a 
lot begins with the auctioneer drawing out a handful of grain from it and visually 
inspecting it for quality. Following this, he announces a (per quintal) starting price. 
Interested buyers also pick up handfuls of grain and visually assess its quality. The 
auctioneer then raises the price incrementally and rapidly, while potential buyers may 
drop out by throwing down the grain they had picked up. The win price is the price at 
which the last but one buyer drops out. The auctioneer receives 0.8 percent of the win 
price. 
                                                            
3 Regulated markets for foodgrains were set up under the Market Regulation Act. Such a market is run by a market 
committee whose functions include maintaining the physical infrastructure of the market place, supervise 
weighment, settle disputes, appoint auctioneers, maintain market records on grain arrivals and sales, and ensure that 
no unauthorized costs are passed on to the farmer. 
4 In some large markets, sales seem to take place primarily through bilateral deals between buyers and sellers, 






2.2. The Data 
The data set was constructed using a primary survey that we conducted in October- 
November 1999.  This information was supplemented using market committee records, 
and personal interviews with millers and farmers. The market committee records 
provide us data on each lot that was auctioned from the middle of October through 
December. These data, for each lot, include the identities of the farmer (whose lot was 
auctioned) and the buyer, the amount of paddy sold (in quintals), and the win price (Rs. 
per quintal). These records cannot be used as a basis for analyzing the auctions as they 
do not record the quality of the lot sold. Basmati paddy is heterogeneous in several 
quality characteristics, variations in which affect the sale price. Second, the market 
committee data do not contain information on the auctioneer's starting price. Third, there 
is no record of either the number of potential bidders for a lot, or the number of bidders 
that are active post the announcement of the starting price. Finally, there is no record of 
the prices, during an auction, at which various players dropped out, and the identities of 
these players. 
In order to redress these shortcomings, we tracked a random sample of 495 
basmati auctions spread over four weeks in the peak marketing season. This forms our 
core data set. For each lot in this data set, we were able to record different quality 
characteristics of the paddy, the auctioneer's starting price, the number of active bidders 
(the number observed after the starting price was announced), the win price, and the 
identity of the winner. Due to the rapidity with which auctions take place, and the large 
number of farmers present, however, it was not possible to observe and record the 
identities of all active bidders and the prices at which they dropped out of the bidding. 
Thus we have no record of participation rates of players, although in some instances 
one can make reasonable guesses.  
In order to record quality characteristics, we talked to agricultural scientists, 
market committee officials, agricultural experts working with the government, and 
bidders at the auctions to find out what characteristics affected paddy prices. From 
these conversations, seven quality characteristics emerged as being potentially 
important. These are: moisture content, uniformity of grain size, grain luster, the 






'other' variables (encapsulating evidence of disease or pest infestation). If the moisture 
content is too low, the grain is brittle and prone to breaking while milling; but beyond a 
point, more moisture simply means there is less rice per kilogram of paddy. The ideal 
pre-milling moisture content is around 14 percent. If the grain is dull, broken, or 
immature, this translates after milling into low grade rice. The buyers at the auction 
perform simple visual and other tests to evaluate quality (such as breaking the grain and 
looking at the cross section for visual evidence of brittleness). For each lot in our 
sample, we performed similar tests while the auction was on, and evaluated each 
characteristic on a scale of either 1 to 3 (worst to best) or 1 to 2 (poor and good)
5. Table 
1 displays summary statistics for our sample.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Data 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Win price (Rs./quintal)  955  99  619  1196 
Starting price 
(Rs./quintal) 
862 85  500 1100 
Number of active 
bidders 
3.52 1.06 1  7 
Moisture content 
(3=ideal) 
2.69 0.49 1  3 
Uniformity in grain size  2.22  0.57  1  3 
Absence of chaff  2.21  0.61  1  3 
Absence of brokens  1.60  0.49  1  2 
Grain  luster  1.81 0.39 1  2 
Green and immature 
grain 
1.21 0.41 1  2 
Other  1.39 0.49 1  2 
 
                                                            






Note the rather wide range in the start and win prices, in itself one indication of the 
substantial heterogeneity in the quality of basmati lots sold.  The modal number of 
active bidders (those we observed participating in the bidding after the announcement 
of the start price) ranged between 3 and 4. 
Apart from the above variables, we constructed a variable capturing the number 
of potential bidders on a given day, from the market committee records. After consulting 
market committee officials and auctioneers, we determined that this number would 
correspond to the number of players who won more than one lot on auction on a given 
day
6. The number of potential bidders is thus a day-specific variable and varies between 
5 and 10. 
 
2.3. The Buyers and Bidders at the Basmati Auctions 
As mentioned above, basmati paddy is bought by private millers, for processing and 
sale in domestic and international markets. A first feature about the buyers at Panipat 
market is asymmetry. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the size of mills differs greatly 
across players, and that millers with larger, more modern mills have the benefit of 
economies of scale. Some of these 'large' millers also cater to international markets that 
are perhaps not accessible to small players but are lucrative. Differential size of mills 
may translate, in the auction, to differential valuations for grain, and therefore, different 
rates of winning the auctions
7. There were 4 large buyers (by market share) in Panipat. 
Their market shares in our sample are (Player G: 18%); (Player A: 13%); Player B: 
12%; Player D: 11%.
8 Other buyers had market shares well below 5%; we refer to these 
as 'small' buyers. 
Other than buyer asymmetry, the important distinction to be made, in the context 
of the auctions at Panipat, is between local millers, whose mills are within a radius of 
about ten kilometers from the market, and distant millers. Most of the millers are local 
(including all the small buyers), but there are important distant millers with mills which  
                                                            
6 Cases of potential buyers who end up not winning anything on a given day appear to be few, and are compensated 
for by cases of buyers who win a few lots and drop out of the market. By and large, most buyers stay the course and 
bid for lots for an entire day of auctions.  
7 Since we do not observe participation rates, this is a conjecture but a reasonable one. 






are far off from the market. Mills are family owned. Local mills are represented at the 
bidding most often by a family member and sometimes by a close associate of the 
family owning the mill. As opposed to this, 'commission agents' called pakka arhtias bid 
for, and purchase grain on behalf of, the distant millers. Their contracts to purchase 
grain stretch over the entire season. Each distant miller has one such commission agent 
(who is licensed to operate in regulated markets such as Panipat) to purchase grain on 
his behalf.  
During the bidding for a lot, the commission agent is in contact with his employer 
by mobile phone. This contact enables the agent to communicate the quality of the grain 
to the miller, and the miller to inform the agent of his valuation or willingness to pay for 
the lot. If this agent wins the auction, he gets 3% of the win price. This form of contract 
(with a 'commission' equal to a percentage of the sale price) has a long history. The 
commission agent is responsible for delivering the grain to the miller, who laboratory-
tests a sample before accepting it. Because of this, and because the market committee 
records the sale price of each lot of grain, it is hard for a commission agent to 
miscommunicate the quality of grain during the bidding, or to misreport the win price. 
Nevertheless, the form of the contract implies that a commission agent's payoff, 
and incentives, are not standard. As a receiver of a percentage of the win price, it is in 
his interest to win the lot at a higher, rather than a lower price 
9.  
In the Panipat market, Player G is a large local miller. Players A, B and D are 
commission agents representing distant mills. The distant millers have larger operations 
than Player G. Player G sells several grades of rice both in the domestic market and the 
Middle East. Some of the rice that Player G sells domestically, and all the rice that he 
sells outside India, sells under the brand names of trading houses and retailers. In 
contrast, the distant millers sell domestically, and to a lesser extent internationally, 
under their own, well-recognized brand names.  
The estimation in Section 4 works with models of (conditionally) independent 
private values. The large market shares of 4 players and the small shares of the others 
suggests that the larger players' values are drawn from stochastically dominant 
                                                            
9 Indeed, if the miller is willing to pay up to v, the agent would prefer the price to go all the way up to v. Of course, 






distributions. In order to probe the form that collusion among the four large players 
might take, we first summarize our sample data using ordinary least squares. The 
dependent variable is log win price, and the explanatory variables are:  (i) the seven 
quality variables for paddy;  (ii) dummies for each of the weeks of our survey;  (iii) a 
dummy for Player G that takes the value 1 if he won the particular lot, and 0 if he did 
not. (iv) A similar dummy for the group of pakka arhtias comprising Players A, B and D. 
Table 2 presents the results.  
 
Table 2: OLS Regression of log win price on quality characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Log Win Price  Estimate  t-ratio 
Moisture content   0.04  5.09 
Uniformity in grain size   0.05  8.89 
Absence of chaff   0.04  6.51 
Absence of broken grain  0.03  5.15 
Grain luster  0.02  2.50 
Green & immature grain   0.03  4.42 
Other factors  0.05  6.91 
Week 2 dummy  0.001  0.22 
Week 3 dummy  0.04  6.14 
Player G dummy  -0.001  -0.13 
Pakka arhtia dummy  0.01 1.99 
Number of active bidders  0.02  7.88 
Constant 6.26  265.95 
R-squared = 0.62     
 
In an IPV model of an ascending auction, the win price of a given lot of grain is 
the second highest valuation (if this is greater than the starting price) amongst the set of 
values that the bidders have for the lot.  The positive signs on the quality variables 
therefore indicate that players’ valuations are positively related to quality characteristics.  
The dummy variables associated with the large players show that Player G, the large 
local miller, had win prices corresponding to the market average (controlling for the right  
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hand variables), whereas the win prices for the commission agents were higher. If the 
value distributions of the large players dominate those of small players, this is 
consistent with the kind of collusive model described in Section 3.2: a cartel comprising 
Players G, A, B and D collude, assigning bidding rights on a lot to either Player G (with 
some probability π ) or to the group including players A, B and D (with probability (1 - 
π )).  Therefore, when Player G bids and wins, there are fewer competing potential 
bidders, and all of them are small players. The win price is a value drawn from a small 
player’s distribution. When a commission agent, say Player A wins, there are more 
competing potential bidders, including players B and D; the win price is therefore likely 
to be higher on average. 
 
3. The Models 
We estimate simple asymmetric independent (conditional on observed quality 
parameters) private values auction models. The main assumptions common to these 
models are (i) Each potential bidder i has a valuation (or willingness to pay)  i v for a 
given lot, which is privately known to the bidder. (ii)  i v is a realization of a random 
variable  i V whose distribution  i F  is common knowledge. (iii) The random variables 
n V V ,..., 1  are independent. The distributions  n i Fi ,..., 1 , = , are lot specific and depend, 
for instance, on the (observed) quality characteristics of the lot. The assumed 
independence is conditional on these lot specific characteristics (we suppress the 
conditioning variables for convenience).  
We believe that the asymmetric IPV assumption is a reasonable approximation 
for this market. For the millers who participate in the bidding, the valuation for a lot of 
grain is interpreted as the difference between the revenue from selling the processed 
rice and the costs of processing, transport and storage. The commission agents who bid 
on behalf of millers are in constant mobile phone contact with the millers during the 
bidding. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that these agents have valuations 
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but are privately known to millers
10. Other firm characteristics that may be privately 
known and contribute to differences in valuations are the markets (domestic or foreign) 
that a firm sells in, and the quality grades of rice that it deals in
11.   
The assumption of asymmetry (that the valuations of different millers spring from 
different latent distributions) is better than an a priori restriction of symmetry, particularly 
because market shares of buyers (Section 2) are skewed. Although the data do not 
record participation rates of bidders, there is good reason to believe that the large 
players listed in Section 2 have systematically higher valuations than the smaller 
players. This results in their winning auctions more frequently, which is reflected in their 
market shares.
12 This is despite the fact that collusion (which we establish later) 
amongst them restricts each of them to bid on fewer lots than would have been the case 
in the absence of collusion. From the observed market shares (as recorded by the 
market committee) and obtaining descriptions of the mills, in terms of their size and 
turnover, over the course of our interviews with various market players, we assume that 
there are four latent value distributions:  3 , 2 , 1 , = i Gi  (1 = Player G, 2 = Player A, 3 = 
Players B and D) and F (distribution for the small players)
13. 
The different models imply different joint distributions for the win price and the 
observed winner. The use of this joint distribution for estimation arises out of a recent 
identification result (Athey and Haile (2002) (Theorems 2(a), 3(i)) and Meilijson (1981)). 
The result implies that under the (conditional) IPV assumption, the joint distribution of 
the second highest order statistic of the random sample  n v v ,..., 1  of valuations and the 
identity of the winner uniquely identifies the latent distributions from which the valuations 
are drawn. 
                                                            
10 One key determinant of processing cost is the conversion factor or ratio of unbroken rice per kilo of paddy. This 
depends on mill-specific machinery in a processing unit, along with quality characteristics of the paddy such as 
moisture content, and whether the processed output is parboiled or raw rice. Conversion factors (conditional on 
paddy quality) vary significantly across mills, and are privately known. 
11 Our data lists the win price for each lot, but information on other bids is absent. Thus simple tests of the IPV 
specification, such as a regression of the highest bid on the second highest bid and quality variables, cannot be 
performed to check for presence of correlation. The absence of resale reduces the appropriateness of an alternative, 
common values framework. 
12 From the market committee records, we find that Player G exited the market on November 19, 1999, with more 
than a month left in the peak marketing season. Our sample ends soon after. Therefore, G's market share in our 
sample is higher than it is in the population (determined by the market committee records).  
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3.1. The Noncooperative Model 
It is well known that in this standard model, it is a dominant strategy for a player with 
valuation v to stay with the bidding until the price ascends to equal this valuation, and to 
drop out thereafter. Therefore, the winner is the bidder with the highest valuation, and 
the win price is the second highest valuation, amongst the values  n v v ,..., 1 , provided that 
both valuations exceed the auctioneer's starting price r. The win price is therefore a 
realization of the second highest order statistic. On the other hand, the win price is r if 
exactly one valuation exceeds the starting price, and the lot is unsold if all valuations 
are less than the starting price.  In our sample 7 percent of the lots sold at the starting 
price, and we did not observe any unsold lots. 
Our data includes, for each auctioned lot, a number p of potential bidders, of 
which m are small players, the auctioneer's starting price r, a number n of active bidders 
(whose values exceed r), the win price w, and the identity of the winner. Under the 
noncooperative model, there are therefore m + 4 potential bidders (i.e. 4 large players). 
So for example, if Player G (whose values are drawn from the distribution  1 G ) wins at a 
price w greater than r, the joint distribution of the second highest order statistic, the 
winner being equal to Player G, and n out of m + 4 potential bidders drawing values 
higher than r is given by Equation 1 below.  
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The first of the six terms in Eq(1) corresponds to events in which Players A, B and D 
have values less than the starting price r, so that the n active bidders consist of Player 
G (the winner) and n-1 small players. As there are m small potential bidders, there are 
C(m, n-1) such events. Note that the probability 
1 )) ( 1 (
− −
n r F  that n-1 small players have 
values exceeding r is not shown, as it gets cancelled with the same term that crops up 
in the denominator in the lower truncated terms appearing in the square brackets. In the 
square brackets, the integral covers events in which all n bidders’ values are less than 
or equal to the win price, and the following term relates to the event that the winner 
Player G’s value strictly exceeds the win price, while the other values are less than or 
equal to the win price. In similar fashion to the entire first term, the second to sixth terms 
capture events in which one or more of Players A, B and D have values exceeding r. 
Finally, note that Eq(1) is valid if the number n of active bidders is at least 4. If n = 3, the 
last term drops out; if n = 2, the last three terms drop out. The density 
) (w hG corresponding to Eq(1) is obtained by differentiating it with respect to w (see 
Appendix A). The maximum likelihood estimation in Section 4 uses this density for data  
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points in which the winner is Player G and the win price is greater than the starting 
price. Similar expressions   , , , , ), ( s D B A i w Hi =  hold when the winners are, respectively, 
Player A,B,D or a specific small buyer; the corresponding densities  ) (w hi are used in the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the model. 
On the other hand, Player G wins a lot at the starting price r if only his value for 
the lot exceeds r. In this case, the joint density of the win price (which equals r) and the 
winner being Player G is given by equation 2. 
)] ( 1 [ )) ( )( ( ) ( ) , Pr( 1
2
3 2 r G r G r G r F G winner r winprice
m − = = =      (2) 
Similar expressions are used when other players win at the starting price for a lot. 
 
3.2. Bid Rotation between Player G and the Group of Commission Agents 
In this alternative model, the four large players form a cartel. They collude by allocating 
bidding rights on each lot to either Player G, or the group comprising Players A, B and 
D. This nonstandard form of bid rotation is driven by the fact that the commission agents 
buy on behalf of millers, and their incentives are not the same as those of the millers 
they represent. Player G is a local miller. His chances of winning a given lot in the 
absence of bidding by the other large players is higher than in the noncooperative 
model. Moreover, the win prices are also likely to be lower, as there are now fewer 
potential bidders, and in particular bidders likely to have relatively high values are 
absent. Therefore, if Player G is assigned to bid on a sufficiently high number of lots, his 
expected payoff is greater than under noncooperation. On the other hand, a large 
commission agent's payoff from winning is a fraction of the win price. This payoff is 
higher the higher is the win price. Therefore, a bid rotation scheme in which all 3 
commission agents bid for a lot has two opposing effects on the expected payoff of a 
commission agent, relative to noncooperation. Excluding Player G improves a 
commission agent's chances of winning, but also reduces the expected win price. If the 
net effect on his expected payoff is positive, such a collusive scheme may work, for 









Under the hypothesis that collusion takes this form, the joint distribution of the 
win price, a specific player being the winner, and n out of p bidders being active is 
somewhat different. For example, for a lot which is won by Player G (at a price greater 
than the starting price), we know that the cartel has assigned bidding rights for this lot to 
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 The major difference between this and the corresponding noncooperative expression 
(Eq(1)) is that the large commission agents are absent, as Player G is bidding. The 
density  ) (w h
C
G is the derivative of Eq(3) with respect to w (see Appendix A). For lots won 
by one of the large commission agents, we infer that the cartel has assigned the group 
comprising Players A, B and D (but not Player G) to bid for the lot. Joint densities 
D B A i w h
C
i , , ), ( =  for the large commission agents are therefore derived by excluding 
Player G from the set of potential bidders. For lots won by Player G at the starting price, 
the joint density analogous to Eq(2) is given by Eq(4) below. 
)] ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( 1 r G r F r h
m C
G − =          ( 4 )  
Specifying a joint distribution and density when a specific small player wins a lot is  
more complicated, since we do not observe whether Player G, or the group of 
commission agents, was bidding for this lot. Suppose the win price is higher than r, a 
specific small player wins, and n bidders are active (their values exceed r). We first work 
out the joint density  ) ( , w h
C
G s that would obtain if Player G were the large player bidding, 
and the joint density  ) ( , w h
C
CA s that would obtain if the large commission agents were 




G s − + . The number 
a may be interpreted as the probability, conditional on a specific small player winning 
                                                            
14 Of course, such a threat, and the suggested ordering of collusive payoffs being higher, is not necessary to sustain 
collusion. More sophisticated strategies using minmax threats and 'reconciliation states' also work. Recent work 
(Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004)) analyzes how efficient collusion can be sustained in a repeated English auction 
setting with independent private values.   
 
 
16   
 
 
the lot, that Player G is a bidder. Similarly, for lots selling to specific small players at 




G s − + .  
 
3.3. Other Models 
In addition to the above, we have estimated several other models. Two of these are 
worth reporting, as they can provide alternative benchmarks. We report estimates of 
these models in Appendix B. The first of these is the efficient collusion model. In such 
collusion, the cartel of colluding players may set up a pre-auction 'knockout' in which 
players reveal their values, the player with the highest (revealed) value gets to bid on 
the object, and transfer payments are worked out across players. In such a mechanism, 
players have an incentive to reveal their true values (see Graham and Marshall (1987) 
for an early discussion).   
In the market that we study, efficient collusion amongst the four cartel members 
is not a promising prospect for two reasons. One, auctions are conducted in the open, 
and take place rapidly; both these factors probably preclude opportunities for revealing 
valuations and hence efficient collusion. Two, the incentives of the commission agents 
are nonstandard, so that it is not obvious that excluding all but one cartel member from 
bidding is best for such an agent (as this may lead to too low a win price). Nevertheless, 
we estimate an efficient collusion model and test it against the bid rotation described in 
Section 3.2, as it is  one of the more commonly discussed models of collusion in the 
empirical auctions literature.    
The joint density of the win price and a specific cartel member being the winner, 
and n bidders being active, now involves an integral. For example, suppose a cartel 
player, say Player G, is the winner, and the win price exceeds the starting price. This 
implies that the other cartel members have values less than Player G's value, and 
Player G's value exceeds the win price. These members don't bid. Thus the win price 
must be the value of one of the small players, and the rest of the small players must 
have values less than the win price. Note however that cartel members who do not bid 
can also have values exceeding the win price (hence the integral). The joint density is 
therefore given by Eq(5) below.  
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The expression takes into account that any of the (n-1) small players with values 
exceeding the starting price could have the value which equals the win price; so this can 
happen in (n-1) ways. The integral describes the event that Player G's value exceeds w, 
and is the highest value amongst the cartel members. On the other hand, if Player G 
wins at the starting price, none of the small players' values exceed the starting price. 
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Joint densities when the winner is some other cartel member are similar.  If the winner 
of a given lot is a specific small player outside the cartel, the joint density we work with 
uses the information that all other players have values less than or equal to the win 
price, while the small player who wins has a higher value. Therefore, the expressions 
are closer in form to those used for the other models. 
Finally, we report results for a standard bid rotation model. In this model, the 
collusive scheme is that for any given lot of grain, exactly one of the four cartel players 
gets the right to bid. Who gets to bid for a lot depends on the outcome of a 
randomization; revelation of values is not involved. For a large commission agent, the 
fact that other large players are absent, while increasing the probability of winning, 
decreases the expected win price. Again, since such an agent's payoff increases in the 
win price, it is not clear that such exclusion of other large players is necessarily 
beneficial. We note here that the regression in Section 2 provides some evidence 
against standard bid rotation, and in favor of the collusive scheme described in Section 
3.2. Under standard bid rotation, we would not expect that the large commission agents 
would have significantly higher win prices compared to Player G's win prices; but this is 
a distinct possibility under bid rotation between Player G and the group of large 
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4.  Estimation and Results 
In order to estimate the non-cooperative and the various models of collusion, we specify 
that the latent distributions of valuations F and  3 , 2 , 1 , = i Gi  for a given lot t are 
lognormal with means  β t x and  3 , 2 , 1 , = + i x i t µ β , respectively. Here,  t x  is a vector of 
characteristics for lot t, including the seven quality characteristics, dummies for two 
weeks, and a constant term; β  is the corresponding vector of parameters. The 
i µ are 
mean shifters for the distributions of the large players. We make the simplifying 
assumption that the three distributions  i G  have the same variance. We estimate all 
models using the method of maximum likelihood, with densities specified as indicated in 
the previous section. 
We find that the collusive scheme described in Section 3.2, viz. bid rotation 
between Player G, (the large local miller) and the group of large commission agents 
(Players A, B and D) best describes the data. Parameter estimates of this model are set 
out below in Table 3.  Estimates for the non-cooperative model, along with the efficient 
collusion and the standard bid rotation models, are given in Appendix B.  
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Model with Bid Rotation Between Player G and 
group of Commission Agents 
 Estimate  t-ratio 
Moisture content   0.04  6.25 
Uniformity in grain size   0.05  9.52 
Absence of chaff   0.03  5.70 
Absence of brokens   0.04  5.62 
Grain luster  0.03  2.93 
Green & immature grain   0.04  5.29 
Other factors  0.06  9.30 
Week 2 dummy  -0.03  -3.31 
Week 3 dummy  0.03  4.40 
Difference in mean for Player G ( 1 µ )  0.16 17.37 
Difference in mean for Player A ( 2 µ )  0.24 14.87 
Difference in mean, Players B and D 
( 3 µ ) 
0.24 19.99 
Variance F  0.21 33.96 
Variance  i G   0.07 19.79 
Constant 6.10  250.44 
Log Likelihood value  -574.2   
 
The log likelihood value for this model is much higher than that for the other models 
(Appendix B). We also test between the above model and the benchmark non-
cooperative model using Vuong’s (1989) test. The test statistic evaluates to 2.02 and  
favours this form of the collusive model over the noncooperative model. 
The signs on the quality variables are positive, indicating that players’ values are 
positively affected by higher quality.  Further, the large local miller, Player G, and the 
three commission agents (A, B and D) draw values from distributions (conditional on 
quality) which have higher means than the mean of the small players’ distribution. This 
fits well with the fact that the four cartel players have large market shares while the  
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others do not.  Notice also that the mean for Player G’s distribution is significantly lower 
than for the group of commission agents. One expects, therefore, that Player G benefits 
greatly if the group of commission agents does not bid when he does. 
 
5. Simulations 
5.1.  A Comparison of Payoffs of the Large Players in the Presence and Absence 
of Collusion 
In order to get a sense of how profitable it is for the cartel to collude per the model in 
Section 3.2, we conduct simulations to evaluate the expected payoffs under collusion 
and noncooperation. We fix the distributions of the various players, using the parameter 
estimates  3 , 2 , 1 , ˆ , ˆ = i i µ β , of the collusive model reported in Table 3.  The vector  t x is 
evaluated at the average quality of the lots that sold in the third week of our sample. We 
then simulate 10,000 auctions with the players drawing values from their respective 
distributions. To simulate the noncooperative model, we have all players draw 
valuations and bid at every auction; thus there is one value drawn randomly from the 
distribution  1 G , one from  2 G , two from  3 G , and several (varying from 5 to 10) from F . 
To simulate collusion, we evaluate one scenario where Player G is the only large player, 
and another scenario in which Players A, B and D (but not Player G) are the large 
players who participate. In either case, Player G’s payoff, when he wins, is the 
difference between his valuation and the win price. His average payoff per lot is the sum 
of these differences for lots that he wins, divided by 10,000. For a commission agent 
(Player A or B or D), the average payoff per lot is 3 percent of the sum of win prices (for 
lots won by the agent), divided by 10,000
 15.  We use a starting price of Rs. 893 per 
quintal, the average for that week. 
Table 4 presents these payoffs for the large players, under collusive and non-
cooperative behavior
16. We vary the number of small potential bidders between 5 and 
10. Columns 2 and 3 give Player G's payoffs per quintal under collusion and  
                                                            
15 In most of our simulations comparing collusive versus noncooperative payoffs, very few lots are unsold (i.e., at 
least one valuation exceeds the starting price). This is consistent with what we observed in our sample; we recorded 
no lot that remained unsold once a starting price had been announced. 
16 Simulations with other quality vectors indicate similar results.  
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noncooperation. Columns 4 and 5 give average win prices per quintal for Player B or D 
(win prices for Player A are very similar as well, and hence not reported), under 
collusion and noncooperation. Player B's payoff for a lot is 3% of this times the number 
of quintals in the lot.  
 





For G under 
collusion 





For B/D under 
noncooperation 
m = 5  17.45 1.10  224.23  210.60 
m = 6  14.42 1.05  203.10  202.70 
m = 7  11.66 0.97  192.86  178.81 
m = 8  9.46 0.87  175.06  165.48 
m = 9  7.64 0.68  162.99  155.82 
m = 10  6.53 0.62  155.33  150.43 
 
As indicated above, for each of the large players, the expected payoffs under collusion 
exceed that of noncooperative play. Since the average lot of grain is about 50 quintals,  
the difference in expected payoffs per lot is fifty times the difference between columns 1 
and 2 (for Player G) and 3% of 50 times the difference between columns 3 and 4 (for 
Players B and D).  Given the larger expected payoffs under collusion, the cartel can be 
sustained, in a repeated auctions setting, by deterring deviations using a threat to revert  
to noncooperation
17. This reiterates the key point that given our parameter estimates,  
the nonstandard collusive scheme described in Section 3.2 can work, owing to the 
different incentives of commission agents, and serves as a further validation of the 
collusive model. 
5.2. The Effect of Collusion on Win Price 
                                                            
17 We do not model this formally. Such formalization would require attention to some key details, such as the 
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We also use simulations to compute average win prices under collusive and 
noncooperative behavior, fixing the distributions in the manner described above. As 
before, under bid rotation between Player G and the group comprising Players A, B and 
D, we consider two scenarios: one in which Player G is the only large bidder, and the 
other where the commission agents are the large bidders. The simulation of non-
cooperation assumes all four large bidders participate in the bidding.  
Given that this is a nonstandard form of collusion, it is interesting to assess the 
extent to which market prices are thus depressed.  For comparisons, we also simulate 
win prices under standard bid rotation amongst the 4 large players (Section 3.3) 
although this form of collusion does not characterize this market.  However, the 
standard bid rotation model might characterize an alternative market structure, one 
where the 4 large players are all local millers. In that case, close associates would 
dictate their bidding, and their payoffs (unlike those of the commission agents) would be 
standard. If efficient collusion is hard to carry out due to the open and rapid nature of 
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Table 5: Average win prices under two forms of collusion and under non-
cooperation  (Rs./quintal) 
Collusion between G & 














G bids  A bids 
5 960.91  1048.42  1049.38  959.12  983.80 
6 970.53  1052.53  1055.44  970.24  995.27 
7 983.07  1058.75  1060.22  983.17  1007.7
5 
8 991.94  1061.77  1064.14  992.27  1016.7
7 
9 1003.58  1066.86  1069.52  1002.85  1025.9
4 
10 1012.49  1071.27  1073.73  1012.47  1034.4
7 
 
Note first that collusion between Player G and the commission agents results in 
significantly lower win prices (Rs.60 - 90 per quintal, compared to the noncooperative 
case), when Player G is the large player assigned to bid for a lot. However, when the 
commission agents bid, the difference declines sharply, to between Rs. 1-3 per quintal.   
This is because on these lots, there is only one less large bidder; when Player G bids, 
there are 3 fewer large bidders. Thus farmers lose substantially only on lots where G 
bids. 
Note that the higher average prices when the commission agents bid is similar to 
the OLS regression result (Table 2) that showed that they pay higher prices (than Player 
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Had this market been characterized by standard bid rotation instead, the prices received 
by farmers would have been substantially lower; by about Rs. 60-90 per quintal on lots 
that Player G bids for, to approximately Rs. 40-60 lower on lots that Player A bid on. So, 
we may infer that the form of collusion which describes the data best, namely,  bid 
rotation between Player G and the group of commission agents, lowers prices much 
less than other forms of collusion. 
 
5.3. The Effect of Alternative Starting Prices on Win Prices and Sales Percentage 
It is natural to ask whether, given the estimated latent distributions, the starting prices 
for lots maximize the expected revenue of the sellers (farmers). However, in the grain 
market setting of this paper, the auctioneer is an intermediary and not the owner of the 
grain. This leads to interesting possibilities and questions (about the optimality of the 
reserve prices, for example) that are otherwise absent. These questions are the subject 
of ongoing research and beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
explore in a simulation, (given the form of collusion that we detect), the expected 
revenue that alternative starting prices result in, for a lot of grain of given quality. In 
Table 6, we present an extract of the kind of results that we get as an answer to this 
question
18. In this extract, we again take the case of a lot of average quality in week 3 of 
the sample and simulate 10,000 auctions each with Player G, and the group of 
commission agents, as the large bidders.  
 
                                                            
18 If bidders are symmetric, the optimal reserve price does not depend on the number of bidders. Since our setting 
has asymmetry, the simulation reports results varying the number of bidders.  
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Table 6: The Effect of Alternative Starting Prices on Win Price and Sale 
Percentage 
  Player G bids  Pakka arhtias bid 
Starting Price 
(m : # small 
potential 
bidders) 
% lots sold  Average  win 
price of lots 
sold 
(Rs./quintal) 
% lots sold  Average  win 
prices of lots 
sold 
(Rs./quintal) 
m = 5      
800 99.9  947.75  100 1048.41 
850 99.4  951.50  100 1048.41 
875 97.9  956.03  100 1048.41 
900 94.9  963.30  100 1048.42 
925 89.9  973.50  100 1048.50 
950 82.5  986.94  100 1049.00 
1000 62.8  1021.69  100  1053.25 
m = 8      
800 100 987.80  100 1061.77 
850 99.9  988.53  100 1061.77 
875 99.6  989.86  100 1061.77 
900 98.4  993.12  100 1061.77 
925 95.8  998.99  100 1061.80 
950 91.3  1008.09  100 1062.08 
1000 76.2  1035.68  100  1064.88 
m = 10      
800 100 1010.38  100 1071.27 
850 99.9  1010.78  100 1071.27 
875 99.7  1011.49  100 1071.27 
900 99.2  1013.16  100 1071.27 
925 97.7  1016.83  100 1071.28 
950 94.8  1023.20  100 1071.34 
1000 83.1  1045.44  100  1076.40  
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If we assume that an unsold lot yields a payoff of 0, then multiplying the average win 
price with the percentage of lots sold gives a measure of expected revenue. For Player 
G, we observe that higher starting prices reduce the percentage of lots sold and 
increase the average win price, and that the net effect is to reduce expected revenue. 
Of the starting prices reported, the lowest one, Rs.800, corresponds to the highest 
expected revenue, irrespective of the number of bidders. As opposed to this, when the 
group of commission agents bid, the highest starting price reported, Rs.1000, 
corresponds to the highest expected revenue. So, if the auctioneer can detect the 
pattern of bidding corresponding to our collusive scheme, one instrument available to 
him is to tailor the starting price quite differently, and substantially higher, when the 
commission agents bid. In our data set, the average starting price when the commission 
agents A, B or D win is higher than when G wins, by about Rs.50. Our simulations 




This paper examines basmati paddy auctions in a grain market in North India, using 
new data from a primary survey, through the structural estimation of several simple 
auction models. It introduces a key feature that characterizes this market -- that some 
distant millers buy grain through commission agents, whose contracts make their 
payoffs nonstandard. In particular, their payoffs conditional on winning increase in the 
win price. This feature may help to explain the form of collusion that best explains the 
data: bid rotation between a large local miller and the group of commission agents 
purchasing on behalf of large distant millers. The paper also shows that efficient 
collusion within this cartel does not explain the data well. 
Simulations then indicate the following points. (i) The payoffs to cartel members 
under collusion of the form described are higher than under noncooperation. (ii) This 
form of collusion has little downward impact on win prices on lots on which the group of 
commission agents bid. (iii) An auctioneer concerned about expected revenue, and 
aware of the form of collusion, would choose much higher starting prices for lots on 
which the commission agents bid, versus those on which the local large miller bids.   
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Like almost all empirical work on structural estimation of auctions, this paper 
treats each auction in the data set as a separate single unit auction. But grain auctions 
across the harvest and marketing months can alternatively be viewed as a multiunit, 
sequential auction. This view has the potential to considerably enrich the work in this 
paper, especially as the kind of collusion that seems to be taking place is better justified 
in a framework of repeated auctions. There is some recent, interesting empirical work in 
dynamic frameworks (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003); Donald, Paarsch and Robert 
(2002)), and an attempt can be made to adapt such methods. However, data on at least 
two additional fronts are needed before one can explicitly model a dynamic auction and 
estimate it. The first is a full set of bids (or prices at which bidders drop out)
19; the 
second is data on mills' inventories of paddy across the season.  
                                                            
19 This data will considerably enrich estimation (and testing) of the static theory as well, by enlarging the variety of 
models that can be used considerably beyond the conditionally independent private values model.   
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Appendix B.  





Moisture content (3=ideal)  0.04  7.86 
Uniformity in grain size (3=best)  0.06  17.06 
Presence of chaff (3=best)  0.04  12.12 
Presence of brokens (2=least broken)  0.03  7.13 
Grain lustre (2=best)  0.03  4.75 
Green & immature grain (2=best)  0.06  12.26 
Other factors (2=best)  0.05  8.67 
Week 2 dummy  0.01  1.07 
Week 3 dummy  0.05  12.26 
Difference in mean for Player G  0.76  25.92 
Difference in mean for Player A  0.74  25.10 
Difference in mean for Players B and D  0.74  25.77 
Constant 5.48  176..46 
Log Likelihood value  -675.43   
 
 





Moisture content (3=ideal)  0.04  5.99 
Uniformity in grain size (3=best)  0.06  12.68 
Presence of chaff (3=best)  0.03  6.92 
Presence of brokens (2=least broken)  0.04  5.75 
Grain lustre (2=best)  0.03  3.05 
Green & immature grain (2=best)  0.07  9.99 
Other factors (2=best)  0.04  5.51  
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Week 2 dummy  -0.03  -2.87 
Week 3 dummy  0.04  5.88 
Difference in mean for Player G  0.09  5.83 
Difference in mean for Player A  0.06  3.68 
Difference in mean for Players B and D  0.04  3.17 
Constant 6.11  297.70 
Log Likelihood value  -866.23   
 





Moisture content (3=ideal)  0.05  6.47 
Uniformity in grain size (3=best)  0.05  11.40 
Presence of chaff (3=best)  0.04  7.62 
Presence of brokens (2=least broken)  0.03  5.62 
Grain lustre (2=best)  0.03  0.03 
Green & immature grain (2=best)  0.06  9.46 
Other factors (2=best)  0.05  6.27 
Week 2 dummy  -0.03  -3.55 
Week 3 dummy  0.02  3.59 
Difference in mean for Player G  0.80  Neg 
Difference in mean for Player A  0.15  14.39 
Difference in mean for Players B and D  0.80  Neg 
Constant 6.10  288.55 




*  Complete list of working papers is available at the CDE website: 
    http://www.cdedse.org/worklist.pdf 